(picture Shuttershock) In Europe, the debate about whether climate change exists is long over. Today, we are experiencing the effects of climate change firsthand, with record-breaking heatwaves, prolonged droughts, recurring summer wildfires and increasingly violent winter floods. The climate is sending us an unequivocal message.

And yet, just as its effects are becoming more apparent, we have witnessed a worrying phenomenon over the last eighteen months: a gradual and deliberate retreat from some of the fundamental principles of the European Green Deal. This is not an explicit rejection — no one dares deny it openly — but rather something more subtle and equally damaging: flexibilisations, postponements, exceptions and revisions that erode its original ambition. These changes are occurring at an increasingly frenetic pace as we approach the end of 2025. It is a kind of 'cupio dissolvi' that is leading Commission leaders to undo what has been built without conducting any meaningful impact studies to understand the consequences of halting this process of economic, industrial and social transformation; a transformation that is indispensable given that the climate emergency persists, even if we choose to ignore it.

Various actors are behind this change of course: part of the agro-industry, segments of the traditional automotive industry, the gas sector, and some right-wing governments attracted by easy consensus, as well as populist and extremist movements. Their strategies are well understood: they exploit economic and geopolitical crises, emphasise the immediate costs of transition and conceal the much higher costs of inaction. They are actively contributing to the slowing down of the Green Deal without offering an alternative vision for growth, social stability or economic prosperity.

This indiscriminate 'deregulation' does not respond to any specific demand from citizens, local administrations or innovative economic actors. Rather, it is the result of ideological fervour and pressure from certain 'incumbent' sectors that are today particularly close to the political right. These sectors have found it easy to gain access to the Commission and governments. If strong and cohesive action is not taken quickly by businesses, politicians and civil society to counteract this, there is now a real risk of emptying the Green Deal of its transformative power. This is not impossible, but we must make up for the lack of reaction, particularly from businesses that have already chosen to go green and from politicians, who must prioritise much more this issue.

Born after the 2019 elections, the Green Deal was intended as a growth strategy for the European Union, aiming to modernise industry, reduce emissions, restore nature and transform agriculture in a fair and sustainable way: EU “man on the moon moment”!  It had three major objectives: achieving climate neutrality by 2050, reducing emissions by at least 55% by 2030 and decoupling economic growth from resource use. In just a few years, Europe has approved an unprecedented legislative package. However, today, this regulatory framework is showing deep cracks: what was once exceptional — the reopening of laws that had already been negotiated before established revision date and even before its entry into force — is becoming routine. This sends a very negative signal to businesses, investors, administrations and citizens. European regulatory stability, one of its hallmarks, can no longer be guaranteed. Furthermore, the Commission and the Council have organised themselves to ensure that this process is as detached as possible from the priorities and logic that led to the Green Deal. The Commissioner responsible for simplification is Valdis Dombrovskis, who was also one of the most sceptical figures regarding the Commission's "green" shift during his previous term. He now has a very broad mandate that touches on the competencies of many of his colleagues, particularly Ribera and Roswall.

There are also growing methodological issues surrounding the implementation of this simplification. The Coreper Working Group, comprising the EU Member States' permanent representatives responsible for simplification, does not include those usually responsible for these matters (Coreper 1). The Commission's 'simplification' proposals are frequently submitted at short notice to the Antici Group, consisting of ambassadors' personal assistants and a Commission representative. This group is responsible for preparing Coreper 2 the evening before its meetings. Coreper 2 is composed directly of ambassadors who usually deal with general affairs, internal affairs and the EU's external relations. Technicians are therefore excluded from discussions about simplification proposals concerning matters outside the competence of that part of the Council. The stated objective is to prevent those who negotiated the previous rules from hesitating when amending them. This fact is not a mere detail; it seems to indicate an intention to dismantle the regulatory framework regardless of the merits and procedures established by the Commission and Council themselves.

The case of agriculture is emblematic. In spring 2024, the Commission withdrew the SUR proposal, which aimed to reduce pesticide use and risk by 50% by 2030. This was the first major setback. Following intense pressure from the agro-industry and a negative vote by Parliament, the decision was made to abandon a regulation that was considered crucial for the ecological transition of the agricultural sector, rather than negotiating a compromise. Meanwhile, the environmental aspects of the Common Agricultural Policy have been gradually weakened: green conditionality was made more flexible in 2024, and Parliament further weakened environmental requirements in 2025. In the current plenary the EP will give final approval to some of these changes, which were negotiated between the EP, the Council and the Commission. Fortunately, the worst demands of the EP itself were not included, but the changes still push for renationalisation and definitely weaken the previously demanded requirements.

This retreat, net of useful simplifications that are certainly possible, responds more to the interests of a powerful agro-industry, than to the real needs of farmers, who are primarily concerned with the value of their products and the income they can obtain from them. This industry is based on the intensive use of resources and soil and is highly dependent on fossil fuels. This is despite excessive dependence on pesticides is undermining the very foundations of agricultural productivity through soil degradation, water contamination and the decline of pollinators. It is now known that the loss of pollinators reduces yields by 7–8% and farm income by around 10%. While pesticides may seem economical in the short term, they generate enormous ecological and economic costs in the medium term. Alternatives exist that work: integrated pest management, biological control, crop rotation and precision farming can reduce pesticide use by 30–50% without reducing productivity, and can sometimes increase profitability. But of course, this is a change that needs to be supported by laws and adequate resources.

Also the Nature Restoration Law, which was designed to restore ecosystems on an unprecedented scale in Europe, was significantly weakened during the legislative process. Initially, the proposal included binding targets for agricultural soils, peatlands, forests, rivers, pollinators and urban areas, including the restoration of 20% of degraded ecosystems by 2030. However, the version approved in 2024, three days after the June elections and after lengthy political wrangling and pressure from certain agricultural sectors and governments, is much weaker. Many targets have been made indicative, commitments for agriculture have almost been eliminated, and a 'food emergency' clause has been introduced that allows obligations to be suspended. The Commission has also lost its supervisory powers, and there is no clear line of dedicated funding. While the law's structure remains, it is in a very diluted form and still under pressure to change. Just last week, President von der Leyen herself appears to have thwarted Commissioner Dombrovskis' attempt to propose changes to this directive, which would certainly have spelled its end.

Since February 2025, the European Commission has systematically used the 'Omnibus' instrument to reopen and amend key Green and Digital Deal regulations, many of which are still being implemented, under the pretext of 'facilitating competitiveness' for businesses. Unlike ordinary legislative procedures, these reopenings do not undergo impact assessments, structured consultations or transparent processes. Instead, they are carried out through direct contact between Commission leaders, senior officials, certain Member States and major economic interests, often without the knowledge of the relevant Directorates-General. According to Commissioner Dombrovskis, the total administrative savings from the 'Omnibus' instrument and other initiatives already presented are expected to be almost €11 billion, with an overall target of €37.5 billion per year by 2029. However, there has been no assessment of the impact of revising these regulations on the economy in general, the decarbonisation process, citizens or the environment. It is no coincidence that the European Ombudsman, Teresa Anjinho, found that the European Commission's handling of Omnibus I on corporate sustainability rules, and the 'simplification' of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) planned for 2024, violated fundamental principles of good administration. These include transparency, inclusiveness, and evidence-based law-making. It is unclear whether the Ombudsman's position will have any effect.[1]

The problem lies not only in the content of the proposals, but also in the fact that once a regulation has been reopened, Parliament and the Council can deviate significantly from the original amendments. During and after the 2024 elections, a significant proportion of the EPP prioritised the fight against Green Deal, breaking the traditional 'cordon sanitaire' by aligning with the climate-sceptical far right. The Commission, which has a monopoly on legislative initiative, knows full well that any decision to reopen files will involve months of additional negotiations, huge costs and the real risk of dismantling its own regulatory heritage piece by piece. The Commission is acting like Penelope, unravelling the Green Deal that she herself wove during the previous legislature. This is a serious strategic error which penalises companies that had already begun to adapt, both inside and outside the EU. It hinders the creation of more robust supply chains and safer investments, as well as a real competitive advantage in a market moving towards ever-greater transparency and sustainability. It favours those with no intention of reducing pressure on resources and the climate. They are under the illusion that, by holding out for a few more years, they can remain 'competitive' without changing their business model. This could involve accessing public resources to stay afloat.

However, this choice of the Commission was and is not inevitable. If the aim is truly to simplify implementation and reduce overlaps, the Commission already has effective tools to achieve this by issuing application guidelines and implementing regulations. This would avoid the need to reopen legislation, which would make the Commission completely dependent on lobbies, moods and volatile majorities in the EP and the Council.

The first victims of this desire for 'deregulation' were the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CSDDD/CRDDD) and the Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (CSRD), which were included in Omnibus I and then further weakened during the negotiations between the Parliament and the Council. The final agreement between the European Parliament (EP) and the Council will be approved at the plenary session in Strasbourg this week. Regarding the CSDDD, the thresholds have been raised to 5,000 employees and €1.5 billion in global turnover for EU companies (or €1.5 billion in turnover in the EU for non-EU companies). This excludes approximately two-thirds of the companies that were initially targeted — over 10,000 companies that would have been required to map and manage risks along the value chain. The specific approach to 'high-risk sectors' has also been abandoned, despite the fact that sectors such as textiles, agriculture, mining and electronics are known to account for most deforestation, human rights violations and pollution dumped on the weakest links in global supply chains. The CSRD revision follows the same pattern: the reporting obligation is limited to companies with over 1,000 employees and a very high turnover (approximately €450 million), excluding 80–90% of medium-to-large European manufacturers that have a significant impact on emissions, resource usage, and transition risks. This greatly reduces the availability of comparable data for investors, banks, and insurance companies at a time when financial institutions are calling for greater transparency in order to assess climate, reputation, and supply chain risks. Unsurprisingly, NGOs such as SOMO and the Business & Human Rights Resource Centre, as well as coalitions of leading companies, are denouncing the fact that due diligence is thus becoming an exercise for a few large groups only, often limited to tier one, which is in open contradiction to the UN's guiding principles on business and human rights, which require consideration of the entire value chain.

NGOs and companies committed to the transition point out that many companies had already invested in due diligence, traceability and climate plans in anticipation of the directives and are now at a disadvantage due to unfair competition from those who continue to externalise the social and environmental costs of their activities. It is no coincidence that the Round Table on Competitiveness — a powerful lobbying platform that brings together major European and US fossil fuel companies — has had a significant impact on this review and deregulation process. It apparently exploited tensions over tariffs with the new US administration to increase pressure to dismantle environmental reporting rules[2].

Once again, the problem lies not in finding ways to simplify and avoid duplication and unnecessary bureaucracy, but in the fact that 'simplification' has taken the form of a structural retreat in this and other 'Omnibus' bills, resulting in a restricted scope and weakened enforcement tools. Moreover, it is by no means certain that these compromises will produce benefits, given the potentially substantial damage they could cause. The administrative savings for excluded companies are modest, temporary, and focused on compliance costs that many companies would have had to bear anyway to satisfy banks, investors, or global customers. In return, the EU is weakening regulatory predictability and deferring to national rules, which complicates life for businesses. It is also sending a signal of retreat to those who had invested in the transition and is depriving itself of crucial tools to reduce risks that are already costing tens of billions of euros a year in climate damage across Europe. In short, the EU has just transformed two pillars of its Green Deal into rules for a few large groups, drastically reducing their systemic impact. The message is clear: in the name of 'reducing burdens', it is deemed acceptable to undermine a key part of the green infrastructure at a time when the economic costs of climate change are increasing.

The same fate has befallen the European Union Deforestation Regulation (EUDR), which was created to reduce the EU's global footprint in supply chains involving soy, beef, cocoa, coffee, palm oil, rubber and wood. Alongside the directives on environmental and social reporting and due diligence, it sets a global standard for sustainable industry and agriculture. Although the regulation remains formally in place, its application was postponed this week in Strasbourg, along with the possibility of revising it within a few months. This is an unprecedented case, but we fear it will not be the only instance of a regulation being revised before it comes into force. As with the directives included in Omnibus 1, the problem is not just the postponement of its implementation. The Commission has decided to reopen this legislation, giving in to pressure from industry and politics without assessing the impact of such a revision. This is a mistake, not least because the EU was establishing an internationally recognised standard with the EUDR that could have had positive global implications, as has already occurred in other areas through the so-called 'Brussels effect', whereby the EU influences global regulations.

It is worth noting that the EU is responsible for around 10% of global deforestation linked to consumption, mainly of palm oil, soy, wood and meat. Every year, around 10 million hectares of forest are lost worldwide, and deforestation generates around 10% of global CO₂ emissions. This has a direct effect on air quality, health and the stability of supply chains, as was strongly highlighted at COP30 in Brazil. The more forests are destroyed, the more fires, diseases and instability in commodity markets increase, creating conditions that make European supply chains more fragile and costly. Deforestation has enormous economic and climatic impacts, and is often the work of organised crime. In the absence of clear rules and sanctions on product traceability, these criminals still find ways to comfortably penetrate the European market. These rules and sanctions were provided for in the current version of the law, but they will certainly be revised.

The industrial and transport sectors have contributed to this general weakening. The revised Euro 7 standard, which was designed to reduce harmful emissions and improve air quality, has been approved in a much weaker form than that recommended by health and environmental experts.

More significant still is the reopening of the debate on stopping the sale of combustion cars from 2035, proposed by the Commission on 16 December. This was an agreement with car manufacturers that seemed set in stone, but it has been called into question also due to a powerful disinformation campaign in particular in Germany and Italy.

The formal framework presented by the Commission remains unchanged: the target of reducing CO₂ emissions by 100% for new registrations in 2035 remains, but in practice this is lowered to around 90%. This is achieved through three measures: free credits for the use of e-fuels and biofuels, additional credits for the use of European 'green' steel and 'supercredits' for small electric cars produced in Europe. Combining these flexibilities could allow up to 23–25% of new cars sold in 2035 to be plug-in hybrids with combustion engines. In real-world conditions, these emit only around 19% less than petrol or diesel cars and are more expensive than an equivalent electric car. Overall, the package appears to be a halfway house: it invests in industry and protects European production, but eases regulatory pressure on CO₂, air quality and safety. This could slow down the transition at a time when global competition is accelerating. Furthermore, data are clear: electric cars reduce emissions by 73% over their life cycle, are three times more efficient and reduce dependence on energy imports. They already account for around 20% of new registrations; the 2035 date refers to the sale of new internal combustion cars, not their continued use.

The introduction of ETS2, the new carbon market for buildings and transport, has also recently been postponed to 2028. This reduces the capacity of the Social Climate Fund to support vulnerable households at a time when there is no real alternative strategy to tackle energy poverty other than encouraging renovation and decarbonisation. It also reduces the incentive for consumers and businesses to switch to less 'fossil'-based forms of heating and cooling. Meanwhile, the proposed revision of the Ecodesign Regulation on space heating appliances, which was opened for public consultation on 25 November, eliminates the ban on gas boilers from 2029 , puts no further deadline and sets efficiency standards that are only slightly more ambitious than the current ones. This is yet another step backwards, delaying and hindering the orderly phase-out of fossil fuels and products.

Another blow to European environmental legislation came with the Omnibus Environment Package, presented by the Commission on 10 December 2025. This "simplification" package affects many European environmental regulations and prioritises decarbonisation over biodiversity and nature protection in the name of cutting bureaucracy. According to the European executive, this could save companies in certain industrial and agricultural sectors €1 billion, making them the only beneficiaries of these measures. Inspired by the Draghi Report, which effectively called for certain environmental regulations to be reopened in order to speed up permitting procedures regardless of the consequences for pollution, the environment and health, this package contains six legislative proposals. These proposals will have to be examined, amended, voted on and approved by the European Parliament and the Council, which is a long and costly process that could further weaken measures in favour of citizens, health and the environment. This would once again bend normal legislative procedures with insufficient impact assessments and limited consultations. The Commission insists on the expected savings for businesses and maintains that the objectives of the Green Deal are not under threat, but rather attempts are being made to make them more 'manageable' for understaffed administrations and businesses required to make substantial investments.

The package proposes amending the Industrial Emissions Directive (IED 2.0) and the Emissions Portal Regulation by removing the obligation to seek safer alternatives to hazardous substances and explain how facilities intend to achieve climate-neutral and circular production. It also allows for further delays in applying best available techniques. The package also excludes organic poultry farms from its remit, reduces transparency on resource consumption for large chicken and pig farms, and opens the door to exemptions from emission limits for hydrogen combustion without adequate prior analysis.

The Waste Framework Directive is also included in the Omnibus. The deletion of the SCIP database on substances of 'high concern' in products creates a gap in the timeline for introducing alternative digital tools, which could affect the ability to track hazardous chemicals in material flows. Regarding extended producer responsibility, suspending the obligation to appoint an authorised representative in each Member State for batteries, packaging, WEEE, single-use plastics and other categories is presented as a relief for businesses. However, it could result in weaker guarantees regarding compliance with environmental obligations, as well as the quality of repairability and durability, particularly for light electric vehicles.

The chapter on environmental impact assessments and authorisations for energy infrastructure, networks, storage and renewable projects is arguably the most contentious. Accelerated procedures, the increased use of one-stop shops and reduced controls could indeed unlock investments that have been blocked for years, particularly in renewables. However, there is a risk that the exception will become the rule and that fossil fuel infrastructure will also end up in the fast lane. This could result in new impacts being concentrated in already sensitive areas, ranging from Natura 2000 sites to major river corridors. The frequent use of the term 'overriding interest' to justify generalised derogations is considered a potential gateway to the permanent weakening of environmental and health safeguards. In terms of products, the package affects battery regulations and other extended producer responsibility rules by suspending the obligation for companies not established in a Member State to appoint an authorised representative. While the intention is to simplify matters, it is clear that this will make it more difficult to enforce environmental obligations and weaken guarantees on the reparability and durability of light electric vehicles.

Alongside presenting the above legislative proposals, the Commission has announced imminent reviews of the Water Framework Directive, the Nitrates Directive and the use of manure and digestate. There will also be a 'stress test' for the Birds and Habitats Directives in 2026 to determine whether these fundamental regulations also require 'tweaking'. These are presented as part of an ongoing monitoring and updating process, not as a step backwards. However, it is clear that, while the omnibus package theoretically maintains the objectives of the Green Deal and the precautionary principle, it introduces a logic of permanent derogation in practice. This logic justifies lowering environmental safeguards and limits in the name of more green or semi-green investments.

On 16 December, the Commission presented also the Omnibus package on food and feed, proposing changes to a wide range of EU regulations, including those on pesticides, feed additives, genetically modified organisms (GMOs), food hygiene, biocides, animal welfare at slaughter, maximum pesticide residue levels and official border controls. Although it is presented as a 'simplification' aimed at facilitating market access for safer biopesticides, the most significant and deeply concerning element is the proposal to introduce unlimited approvals and authorisations with strictly defined exceptions. Furthermore, the proposal removes the obligation for Member States to consider the latest independent scientific evidence when authorising plant protection products at a national level. Once again, these proposed changes are being made without an impact assessment and are completely disproportionate to the stated objective of the omnibus exercise, which is to 'simplify existing legislation'.

I would like to emphasise once again that European citizens do not seem to be calling for a retreat on climate action. Surveys show that 81% support climate neutrality, 84% consider climate change to be a health priority, and 90% call for increased investment in adaptation measures. In short, Europe is not facing an ideological luxury in the form of the Green Deal, but rather an obligation to prioritise protecting lives, jobs, biodiversity and democracy on a continent already affected by extreme weather events. This should not be done at the expense of economic actors and businesses, but equally some of them should not be given an absolutely priority role in deciding the EU's priorities as stakeholders.

The fundamental question is not whether we can afford the energy and ecological transformation initiated by the Green Deal, but whether we can afford to backtrack halfway through. All the data — economic, scientific, social and political — point in the same direction: backing down now would be an incomprehensible waste of time and resources. It is a deeply irrational process with unproven benefits. Implementing the Green Deal and ensuring it is socially just is not only an environmental challenge; it is also a prerequisite for Europe to remain a liveable, prosperous and democratic place. It is the basis of our industrial independence.

Monica Frassoni, Brussels, 17 December 2025