Yesterday, an important vote on Mercosur took place in the European Parliament. Parliament decided to request an opinion from the European Court of Justice on the agreement's compliance with European law. Many saw this as an unwelcome “halt” or a further weakening of Ursula Von Der Leyen. Or even as proof of the strength of improper alliances between the nationalist right and the extreme left in obstructing one of the few good ideas that can be put forward in the Trump era, namely seeking new economic and commercial partners. Frankly, I disagree with this point of view. Perhaps because I am a former MEP and I think that one of the risks facing the EU today, in its eagerness to please not only Trump but also its strongest governments and the various interests of powerful corporations, is that of forgetting not only the concerns of a significant part of public opinion on both sides of the Atlantic, but also transparency and respect for rules and procedures. These are not there by chance. Moreover, it is important to note that this vote does not block the “provisional” application of the trade part once the Mercosur countries have ratified the agreement.

But let's take a closer look at what this is all about. The EU-Mercosur agreement is one of the largest and most controversial trade agreements ever negotiated by the European Union. Just think: negotiations have been going on for 25 years. It involves around 780 million people in Europe and four South American countries: Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay. It will have a real impact on agriculture, industry, employment, the environment, health and European democracy. To avoid any misunderstanding, it is important to clarify that criticising this agreement does not mean being opposed to trade agreements in general. In an increasingly unstable geopolitical context, it is essential for the European Union to diversify its economic relations with other regions of the world, not least to reduce strategic dependencies, particularly on the United States.

The problem is that this agreement, as it stands, distributes costs and benefits unevenly. In terms of agriculture and the environment, it favours a model based on intensive agriculture, large industrial livestock farms, heavy use of pesticides and strong pressure on forests and biodiversity, particularly in the Amazon. This is not a minor detail: over 40% of Mercosur's exports to the EU are agricultural products and raw materials. This puts pressure on European agriculture, especially small and medium-sized farms, which comply with much stricter environmental and health regulations. It is true that, in theory, only products that meet these standards can enter Europe. But in practice, controls currently cover a minimal portion of imports, less than 4%. Even increasing them by 30%, as promised by the Commission, will not change the situation much.

At this point, people say: “Let's compensate farmers with more subsidies”. But this is the wrong response. Because this agreement does not improve the agricultural production model, either here or in the Mercosur countries. It does not accompany the ecological transition, nor does it strengthen local supply chains. It consolidates an already unsustainable model and then tries to compensate for the damage with public money. And the problems do not stop there. Other sectors also risk negative effects: downward pressure on social standards and working conditions, greater difficulties for European SMEs, advantages concentrated on large multinationals.

There are also serious issues of democratic control and consistency with European laws: for this reason, a cross-party group of 144 MEPs requested and obtained that the EP seek an opinion from the Court of Justice of the EU on three key points:

First point: how the agreement was constructed.

Governments and the Commission agreed to split it into two parts and bring the trade part into force without a vote by national parliaments and on a “provisional” basis before ratification by the EP. This raises serious doubts about compliance with European rules and is a real snatching of the EP's powers, which took place with the complicity of President Metsola, who, instead of safeguarding her institution, preferred to bow to the governments.

Second point: a “safeguard” clause that provides for the possibility of Mercosur countries being compensated if the EU approves new environmental, health or food safety standards that reduce exports from Mercosur. In practice, greater protection of the environment and health could become punishable.

Third point: the precautionary principle.

This is the principle that allows Europe to block products or practices when there are risks to health or the environment, even if the science is not yet definitive.

This principle risks being weakened because the agreement reduces controls on agricultural imports and entrusts many decisions to arbitration mechanisms.

Somewhat surprisingly, the European Parliament approved this request by a very narrow majority. It is important to clarify, however, that this decision should not block its provisional application if the Mercosur countries complete their internal ratifications. Nevertheless, if the Court were to challenge any of the three points mentioned, the political and legal consequences would be significant and would require a revision of certain parts of the agreement.

The key point that we must never forget is that, ultimately, Mercosur is the product of a 1990s vision based on the idea that more trade and fewer rules automatically lead to growth and prosperity. Today, however, the European Union and the world as a whole are facing crises in climate change, food security, ecological transition and inequality. The time that is now opening up can and must be used to amend the agreement, making environmental and social commitments binding, strengthening the rules and ensuring full respect for democratic prerogatives. Without this step, even the EU-Mercosur agreement risks remaining totally incapable of responding to the challenges of the present.